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When five Eastern Caribbean countries recently moved to enact a new regional Citizenship-by-Investment (CBI) regulatory authority under a bill labeled the Eastern Caribbean CBI (ECCBI), the legal and constitutional alarms in some quarters began blaring. To many observers, this initiative appears to be not just a policy pivot, but a direct challenge to the foundational logic and institutional design of the Treaty of Basseterre—the instrument that created and governs the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).

I proceed here with a deep dive into the legal architecture, the constitutional tensions, and the paradoxes embedded in the ECCBI project — starting with the first fourteen articles of the Treaty and working outward.

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The Treaty of Basseterre: Powers and Limits

First, a quick primer:

• The original Treaty of Basseterre was signed on June 18, 1981, by the governments of Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines, thereby creating the OECS.
• In 2010 a Revised Treaty of Basseterre was adopted to establish deeper economic union (the Eastern Caribbean Economic Union).
• The Revised Treaty defines the organs of the OECS, allocates legislative and functional competences, and prescribes constraints on how Member States may delegate authority.

A handful of key provisions (up to Article 14) are germane:

1. Article 7 establishes the organs of the Organisation — the authority, council of ministers, assembly, economic affairs council, commission, director-general, etc.
2. Article 8 describes the composition and functions of the OECS Authority (the supreme decision-making body)
3. Article 9 deals with the Council of Ministers.
4. Article 10 provides for an OECS Assembly (a consultative or parliamentary filter).
5. Article 11 establishes the Economic Affairs Council, to coordinate economic integration.
6. Article 12 constitutes the OECS Commission (the administrative arm) and sets out its role.
7. Articles 13 and 14 cover the Director-General and the areas of legislative competence of the Organisation (i.e., the subjects on which OECS organs may adopt binding measures).

Crucially, Article 14 delineates the legislative competences of the OECS: the domains in which the Organisation may enact measures binding on Member States (subject to certain rules).

Thus, the drafters of the Treaty envisaged a careful balance: Member States would retain sovereignty over most matters, but would cede limited authority to regional organs in enumerated areas. Any new regional organ or regulatory scheme that falls outside those enumerated areas would seem, on face, to run the risk of ultra vires (beyond power) action.

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The ECCBI Bill and the Claim of Authority

The ECCBI proposal (sometimes seen as ECCIRA in press reports) is framed as the legal vehicle to give effect to an agreement already made by heads of government of participating states. But this triggers several hard questions:

1. On what basis does this “agreement” claim legitimacy?
   The bill’s section 1.1 reportedly states that an agreement exists. But who made it? Was it the OECS Authority? Or was it a subset of Member States acting outside OECS structures? If the latter, does that accord with Treaty protocol? Mere signature by heads of government does not substitute for compliance with the institutional and constitutional obligations mandated by the Treaty.
2. Is the agreement compatible with Article 14 (and related Treaty provisions)?
   If citizenship-by-investment regulation is not among the expressly delegated competences of the Organisation, then transferring authority to a regional body may violate the Treaty’s constitutional ceiling. Indeed, the Treaty does not mention citizenship, naturalization, or passports among the OECS’s legislative domains. The ECCBI proponents would need to show a Treaty amendment or supplemental protocol authorizing this domain.
3. Can a subset of OECS states create such an organ without full consensus or following OECS protocols?
   The Treaty is explicit in how organs are formed, how decisions are made (usually by consensus or qualified majority), and when protocols or amendments can be introduced. If five states proceed without the required unanimity or sans proper OECS process, that might constitute a breach of obligations under the Treaty.
4. Is there a legal entity called “Eastern Caribbean Citizenship” or “Eastern Caribbean Citizenship by Investment”?
   Indeed, the critique that “there is no such animal” has force. Citizenship is, under domestic and international law, a sovereign act of a state in relation to its nationals. There is no preexisting “Eastern Caribbean citizenship” as a supranational status to which one can invest. Thus, the name “Eastern Caribbean Citizenship by Investment” appears, at face value, a misnomer — a rhetorical device to confer a semblance of regional legitimacy to what is, in effect, a national scheme camouflaged. If the entity (Eastern Caribbean Citizenship) does not yet exist as a legal construct, its claimed regulatory authority is vacuous.

Hence, the argument goes: one cannot have regulatory authority over that which does not exist. The organ is being created out of thin air, in reaction to pressures — to institutionalize a control mechanism without first establishing a legitimate legal basis grounded in the Treaty.

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Anatomy of the Tension: Sovereignty, Regionalism, and Panic

This battle is not merely technical or legalistic: it reflects deeper fissures in Caribbean regionalism and sovereignty.

• Sovereignty and citizenship are among the most sacrosanct powers of a state. To cede or pool aspects of them requires clear, democratic, and constitutional decisions.
• The urgency with which states are pushing the ECCBI reflects panic — responding to international pressure, reputational risk, and the volatility of the CBI industry. The regulatory drive may be less rooted in constitutional logic than in crisis management.
• The approach of branding this new authority as “Eastern Caribbean” may be designed to give a patina of regional legitimacy to what is, in substance, a regionalization of national programs — thereby constraining future national discretion.

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Key Questions That Must Be Answered

1. Who exactly signed the agreement referenced in section 1.1, and through what OECS-sanctioned process?
   Absent an OECS Authority decision or protocol conforming to Treaty rules, the agreement’s legitimacy is suspect.
2. Was the agreement or bill subject to review by the OECS organs mandated in Articles 7–14 (e.g. Assembly, Economic Affairs Council, Commission)?
   Bypassing those organs undermines the Treaty-based checks and balances.
3. Is a protocol or amendment route being used to expand the authorised domain of the OECS to include CBI regulation?
   If not, the ECCBI proposal may overstep the Treaty’s authority envelope.
4. Have Member States debated or ratified a distinct concept called “Eastern Caribbean citizenship”?
   Without that foundational legal status, the regulatory authority lacks substrate.
5. Will national legislatures be required to incorporate or domesticate the ECCBI as part of their constitutional compliance obligations?
   If a national parliament has not ceded sovereignty or law-making prerogative in relation to citizenship, then conflicts may ensue.

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Possible Outcomes and Risks Ahead

• Legal challenges: Constitutional or treaty-based litigation may arise in one or more Member States. A court could hold that the ECCBI/ ECCIRA is ultra vires or void for violating the Treaty.
• Institutional backlash: Non-participating OECS members or treaty purists might pull back from further cooperation, weakening unity.
• Operational confusion: If ECCBI is implemented without clarity, differences in national CBI regimes may persist, undermining the uniformity the drafters hope to achieve.
• Credibility risk: If the ECCBI is struck down or seen as lacking legitimacy, it may further damage the reputation of CBI programs in the region and fuel external scrutiny.

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Final Reflections: Region in Search of Its Legal Soul

To my mind, the ECCBI endeavor presents a crisis not just of regulatory reform but of constitutional integrity in the OECS. When states begin creating new organs under the pretense of regional authority without clear Treaty backing, they flirt with rogue constitutional innovation. Naming something “Eastern Caribbean Citizenship by Investment” does not make it so; authority must flow from established treaties, not from exigency or branding.

If Section 1.1 hints at an agreement made outside proper OECS protocol, or if five states attempt to bind themselves to a new sovereignty-sharing body without full legitimacy, then they risk violating the very Treaty that binds them together.

A path forward demands transparency: full public access to the draft agreements; constitutional scrutiny in national parliaments; OECS organs exercising their proper oversight; and, if necessary, a formal protocol or amendment to the Treaty of Basseterre that explicitly grants authority in the citizenship domain — rather than sneaking it in through back channels.

I remain skeptical that the ECCBI in its current conception can satisfy these rigorous standards. But the debate now must shift from rhetorical denunciation to careful legal analysis — for the fate of regional integration and national sovereignty may hang in the balance.